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ANIMALS, BRAINS, AND SPIRITS 
Charles Taliaferro 
This paper contains an overview of the significance of dualism for theism 
and a modal argument for dualism. It concludes with remarks on the rele-
vance of the modal case on behalf of dualism for an intramural materialist 
quarrel between animalists and brain-identity theorists. 
The Perils and Prospects of Dualism 
There are some very good reasons why theists want to explore nondual-
ist theories in the philosophy of mind. Dualism appears to face 
intractable problems accounting for mind-body interaction, for the indi-
viduation of nonphysical beings, and for our knowledge of the mental 
life of other persons. Dualism seems vulnerable to private language 
arguments (can dualism account for the meaningfulness of mental dis-
course?) and dualism is often considered a prime target for Ockham's 
razor. Moreover, dualism is often considered public enemy number one 
on religious and ethical grounds. It faces the charge of promoting a Iife-
threatening, body-denigrating asceticism, of encouraging homocentric 
approaches to the environment, and of favoring an ethic of individual-
ism more generally. It has also been accused of advancing a sexist agen-
da that privileges a male bias in matters of inquiry and substance. 
Within contemporary Christian theology, dualism has often been cast 
as a Hellenistic import, more Athens than Jerusalem, and many hold 
that authentic Christianity is holistic, if not materialistic. If Christian 
theism can be shown to be compatible with theories other than dualism 
it may be seen as more stable (rejection of dualism need not entail rejec-
tion of Christianity) and perhaps slightly less offensive to those drawn 
to naturalism. In brief, dualism is often considered extravagantly 
wrongheaded-politically, ethically, scientifically, aesthetically, theolog-
ically and philosophically. 
Notwithstanding the ghastly legacy of dualism and the promise of 
more in-vogue alternatives, I think caution is in order, at least from the 
vantage point of classical theism. Many of the reasons employed to 
argue against mind-body dualism have been used with equal relish to 
argue against the traditional theistic understanding of God and the 
incarnation. So, the objection to dualism that mind-body interaction 
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involves something altogether unintelligible because causal relations can 
only be realized between physical entities constitutes an objection to the-
istic claims about God who, as a nonphysical reality, causally affects the 
physical world, sustains it in existence, miraculously reveals Godself in 
human history, and becomes incarnate. Many philosophers and theolo-
gians explicitly link their doubts about dualism with their doubts about 
traditional theism (Paul Edwards, Kai Nielsen, Michael Martin, Anthony 
Kenny, Jonathan Barnes, Richard Rorty, Grace Jantzen, and others).! 
These critics are right, I believe, in thinking that dualism and theism 
enjoy a close conceptual affinity, and there is therefore some reason for 
theists to defend the coherence of dualism at certain key points even if 
they do not embrace it as an accurate portrait of how things stand in this 
world. It may well be that metaphysically less loaded positions in the 
philosophy of mind like functionalism (which is allegedly quite neutral 
about the truth of dualism) can be of use to theists in defending the 
intelligibility of some theistic claims, but these moves alone will not suc-
ceed in confronting some important anti-theistic obstacles.2 
I believe tha t a fairminded, reasoned case against dualism must take 
seriously the ways in which a version of dualism may do justice to the 
unified nature of embodied life. Insofar as one takes a substantive dual-
ist stance that goes beyond property dualism (a la Kripke, Chisholm, 
others), one may well contend that the person qua nonphysical individ-
ual can exist apart from his or her body, either altogether disembodied 
or in a different embodiment. From a substantive, dualist perspective, 
personal identity is possible notwithstanding such body-switching. This 
conforms to the Cartesian principle, according to which possible onto-
logical separability (God can preserve' A' without 'B') is a sufficient con-
dition for individuation.' But allowing for this under exotic conditions 
does not mean that under ordinary, embodied conditions the person 
should be treated as a bifurcated, split reality. Critics like Ilham 
Dillman, Anthony Kenny, George Baker, P.M.S. Hacker, Daniel Dennett, 
Paul Snowdon, and others continue Gilbert Ryle's strategy of harnessing 
dualists with a fragmented picture of the mind-body relationship. Some 
caricature dualism as positing a cloudy, marshmallow-like ghost circling 
the body or as a tiny person, an homunculus, hidden behind a gross 
material body.' These comic pictures do not seem to me to be at all fair. 
I believe a dualist can understand embodiment in profoundly integrated 
terms in which the person's affective, sensory, cognitive, and conative 
life are fully realized materially. According to what may be called inte-
grative dualism, embodiment involves a truly unified life in which (ide-
ally) one's body is felt from within (proprioceptively), and one feels, 
thinks and acts as a psycho-physical whole. An integrative dualist need 
not deny that a person sees, thinks, acts and feels as a complete, wholly 
embodied being. In an integrative understanding of the person-body 
relation, the relation is not cast as the relation of a pilot in a ship, nor a 
person in a chariot or in prison or wearing a suit. 
If one takes on board this integrative picture of the mind-body rela-
tionship, one can see one's way through such ethical objections as the 
claims that dualism automatically denigrates bodily life, or treats the 
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body as inconsequential to human welfare, or promotes anti-environ-
mentalism. Indeed, one may embrace dualism along with a more com-
prehensive, "green" understanding of the ways in which our integrative 
embodiment is tied in with a whole network of natural relations. As for 
nonhuman animals, most contemporary dualists adopt a dualist under-
standing of nonhuman animal life. Dualism need not be Cartesian in its 
construal of animal mentality. Paradoxically, those most set on denying 
mental life to nonhuman animals (and thus those most sympathetic to 
Descartes' anthropocentrism) are hostile to dualism (e.g. R G. Frey). 
Many of the theological objections to dualism are based on isolating a 
Cartesian or Platonic version of dualism rather than the integrative alter-
native. Thus, some object to dualism because of its treating the person 
(soul, mind or self) as innately immortal and hence as something more 
Platonic than Biblical. But such immortalism is not entailed by a dualist 
treatment of the person; the metaphysical possibility of surviving death 
by body-switching or disembodiment does not amount to a guarantee 
this will occur. It is also due to the prominence of an exaggerated 
Platonic-Cartesian portrayal of the person-body relation that dualism is 
thought to be at odds with Christian teaching about the incarnation, cru-
cifixion, resurrection, and ascension. Because we are nonphysical and 
yet embodied beings, claims about Christ's embodiment are not compro-
mised by Christ's nonphysicality. I believe that a traditional, 
Chalcedonian understanding of the incarnation requires a profoundly 
integrated view of embodiment as well as recogition of the pre-existence 
of Christ, and thus it will require a dualist anthropology.s 
Let me fill out my proposal of integrative dualism in cognitive terms. 
I believe the integration of our cognitive faculties should be seen as part 
of the integrated person-body relation. On this front, an integrative 
dualist may draw on Alvin Plantinga's recent work on warrant (though 
other frameworks might also be employed such as Linda Zagzebski's 
virtue epistemology). For Plantinga, warrant is a matter of true beliefs 
being acquired by cognitive faculties functioning properly. He resists 
various forms of internalism, because of their failure to accommodate 
the many ways in which doing our epistemic duty is compatible with a 
host of disfunctions, such as being subject to brain lesions, tumors, way-
ward bursts of cosmic energy, Alpha Centaurian cognitive scientists, 
and Demonic tempering. Anyone of these disasters is capable of 
prompting true beliefs in ways that dramatically undermine claims of 
warrant.6 Most of these disfunctions can be read as respects in which a 
mind-body integrated embodiment is impaired. I do not propose that 
warranted beliefs (as analyzed by Plantinga) are essential for dualistic 
embodiment; one can be embodied and yet subject to many cognitive 
impairments. My thesis is that flagrant cognitive disfunctions can readi-
ly be understood as compromising or breaking down an integrated, 
dualistic embodiment. Warranted embodiment is a feature of a devel-
oped integrative psycho-physical life. 
This integrative person-body relation is something I have sought to 
articulate in Consciousness and the Mind of God, grounding it in the good-
ness of God.7 I shall only briefly note here my strategy, again drawing 
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on Plantinga's work. Plantinga uses his treatment of warrant in articu-
lating reasons for embracing theism, with proper cognitive functioning 
analyzed as functioning the wayan all-good God intends. This move 
recalls Descartes' appeal to God's goodness in his account of cognitive 
reliability and, before that, of Plato, for whom the Good "imparts ... the 
power of knower to the known."8 In my book I have sought to do 
something similar by combining theories of value, cognition, and some 
recent work in psycho-analysis. It is the goodness and practical reason of 
those charged with raising children that is essential for fully realizing 
integrative embodiment. In the work of Melanie Klein and others, one 
can see how affective, cognitive, and conative interplay aimed at the 
child's welfare plays a crucial role in the child's developing identity. 
Within an integrative picture of person-body embodiment one can, I 
believe, give pride of place to such intersubjectivity and eschew the nar-
row individualism and the isolation often thought to dog dualism in all 
its forms. This sort of upbringing-what a Kleinian may call a mind 
within a milld-can provide a model of what the Creator-creation rela-
tion amounts to, thereby reflecting an integrative understanding of 
God's immanent presence in the world." 
While there are various reasons whv theists should be hesitant to con-
strue the God-cosmos relation as analogous to the person-body relation 
(e.g. presumably creaturely autonomy and contingency over against 
God's will and aseity constitute disanalogies), there are reasons for 
underscoring some kinship. For those of us who are passibilists, believ-
ing God is affectively present to the cosmos, sorrowing over its ills and 
taking delight in its goods, the ways in which dualism treats person-
body dependency is illuminating. William Wainwright introduces a 
note of caution here. 
Mind-body interactionism would seem to provide a more 
appropriate model of the God-world relationship, but it is objec-
tionable on two counts. According to classical theism, God acts 
upon the world but the world does not act upon God. 
Furthermore, by allowing a certain independence of mind and 
body, the model fails to provide for the radical dependence of 
the world upon God which is so essential to classical theism.lO 
As for mind-body models, Wainwright thinks the Platonist one with its 
picture of a remote mind is more congenial to classical theism. This may 
be, but the very reasons that give pause to Wainwright give sustenance 
to those who are concerned with emphasizing the immanent, integrative 
theology of creation, which is certainly a vital strand in the tradition 
going back to Biblical testimony. In particular, a more integral under-
standing of God and creation allows us to respond to some feminist con-
cerns. Consider Hilde Hein's complaint about Cartesianism and theism. 
In dualism, the soul's principle activity of "unmoved, aloof" cognition is 
without emotion. It is 
untouched by the object it cognizes. Pure and dispassionate the-
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oretical knowledge is self-contemplative and has no practical 
ends. Modeled upon a conception of the Divine as pure subject, 
wholly self-sufficient, omnipotent and omniscient-mind, unen-
cumbered by bodily needs or passions, is wholly free. 11 
By thinking of God as passionate, affected by the cosmos by virtue of 
God's creative activity and supreme goodness, we can provide an alter-
native to this more aloof Platonic model. 12 
Why accept dualism? Like the distinction drawn in discussions 
of the problem of evil between a defense and a theodicy, one might well 
distinguish between defending the intelligibility of dualism from the 
more ambitious aim of establishing its truth. Elsewhere I have sought to 
undertake a defense of dualism, appealing, for example, to qualia in reply 
to eliminativists, to various thought experiments in reply to functionalist 
and private language arguments, and to the combination of dualism and 
theism in reply to physicalist appeals to simplicity. There are a variety of 
more positive arguments that would move us beyond a defense; these 
include appealing to personal identity over time, mind-body interaction, 
and the indivisibility of persons as basic subjects.13 In the rest of this 
paper I shall put in a plug for my preferred argument for dualism, a 
Cartesian argument based upon the ostensible metaphysical possibility of 
disembodiment and body-switching. I shall provide an outline of the 
argument in the next section, reply to two objections, and conclude with 
comments on a dispute internal to materialism. The version of the argu-
ment I adopt makes use of de re attributions of modal properties, the 
principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, and thought experiments. 
A Modal Argument for Dualism 
There are reports of out of the body experiences (henceforth OBEs) 
across many cultures throughout the world. Some reports are of great 
antiquity while many are contemporary. There are many cases of first 
person reports in the 20th century from persons of quite dissimilar back-
grounds, ages, and religious outlooks, (A. J. Ayer, Somerset Maugham, 
and Carl Jung all reported undergoing OBEs). Moreover, there are some 
striking similarities in accounts from various religions of what OBEs will 
occur after death. Compare, for example, the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the 
Brhad Aranyaka Upanishad, and the Apocalypse of Abraham. Reports of 
OBEs have been advanced with great vividness and detail in which-to 
alter the words of T. S. Eliot-people take themselves to have left their 
bodies on a distant shore (Four Quartets).14 
I believe that such tales do describe something metaphysically possi-
ble, even if the occurrences of OBEs are induced by exclusively natural-
istic causes (triggered by hypercapnia and hypoxia, vascular or ischemic 
activity, and the like) and they do not represent cases of veridical per-
ception by subjects that are actually functioning independent of their 
bodies. We cannot endorse an unqualified Humean precept that con-
ceivability ipso facto entails possibility, but we can, I think, claim that 
careful conceiving of a state of affairs in which one attends to the details 
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of the case and considers the intelligibility of the state of affairs with 
respect to one's background knowledge independently secured, gives 
one prima facie warrant in believing that what one takes to be meta-
physically possible is indeed so. Conceiving of ostensibly possible states 
of affairs can go astray on all sorts of grounds; our grasp of the individu-
als and properties involved may be truncated, we may fail to test our 
modal intuitions adequately against background information, and so on. 
But I submit that a presumption of warrant based on focused, critical 
examination of the state of affairs at issue seems to reflect the standard 
employment of thought experiments in everyday life (as pointed out by 
Roy Sorensen in Thought Experiments) and that the use of dualist body 
switching and disembodiment cases seems no worse than the use of 
many forceful thought experiments in the literature in ethics, epistemol-
ogy and other areas of metaphysics. ls Tailoring the appeal to thought 
experiments to the first person, I believe I can coherently conceive of 
myself switching bodies, coming to have a very different one, and my 
present body ceasing to be. I can imagine myself coming to occupy one 
of the shadowy levels of Dante's purgatory, for example, or switching 
bodies with a king or pauper without any part of my body switching 
places. I can also imagine more drastic disembodiment in which I 
become, in the words of Olaf Stapleton, "a disembodied wandering view 
point."'6 Such imagining amounts to my attributing to myself certain 
properties my body does not have. I do not think it is plausible to 
believe that physical objects-ships and human bodies, say-can 
become nonphysical or switch places with other ships and bodies with-
out exchanging physical parts. If such limitations and attributions are 
reasonable, then, assuming the principle of the indiscernibility of identi-
cals, it is reasonable to conclude I am not by body. 
There are, of course, many objections to this line of reasoning. I use a de 
re version of the argument to get around some of them. Thus I do not put 
all the weight on an abstract de dicta claim like "There is nothing incoherent 
or self-contradictory in the supposition that a person can exist disembod-
ied." One might well adopt that claim and cheerfully point out that it is 
quite compatible with particular persons being essentially embodied. It is 
largely because of its de dicta formulation that Richard Swinburne's modal 
argument comes under attack by Peter Unger, Sydney Shoemaker, William 
Alston, and Thomas Smythe." I realize that the de re dualist argument will 
strike some as unalterably primitive and anti-scientific, holding philosophy 
of mind hostage to drug-induced visions, reports by clairvoyants, new age 
religious propaganda, quixotic story telling about Etheric Projection (Astral 
Projection), and pseudo-deaths. But, if dualism is not in conflict with what 
we know scientifically and metaphysically (as I have sought to argue else-
where), and if we can lucidly and soberly conceive of these out of the body 
maneuvers, then I do not see why we should resist their force. I would go 
further and claim that parapsychology gives us reason to believe in the 
actual survival of some people after biological death for a brief period of 
time, but for now I only appeal to OBE reports as backing up and filling 
out what might otherwise be a merely academic thought experiment." 
Is the argument question-begging? This is probably the most com-
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mon worry. I do not think one already has to be a dualist in order to 
accept the out of body cases as bona fide metaphysical possibilities. 
Probably many people have OBEs without being dualists; perhaps they 
have no extant philosophy of mind at all. Of course, thought experi-
ments can be cast as ways of making explicit what one already believes, 
and herein lies Gilbert Harman's complaint that thought experiments do 
not inform us about the nature of reality. However, unless we have good 
reason to be radically skeptical about our beliefs, dualist thought experi-
ments can be understood as sharpening our grasp of our own identity, 
enabling us to bring ourselves into clearer focus and challenging rival 
materialist assumptions. Also by way of replying to the objection of 
question-begging, it is worth pointing out that some non-dualist philoso-
phers have claimed that disembodiment andlor body switching is possi-
ble. In these cases the philosophers will use various devices to then 
avoid embracing the dualist consequences by appealing to a de dicta 
account of self-reference (Armstrong), counterparts in other possible 
worlds (D. Lewis), a fluid compositional mer eo logy G. Pollock, R. Boyd, 
and others). In a sustained case for dualism, I would underscore positive-
ly the admission by these philosophers of possible disembodiment and 
body switching and then argue that their account of the possibilia is less 
plausible than a dualist one. '9 Having breezed by some of the objections 
and counter-arguments, let me develop in greater detail a reply to what 
may be called the parity objection and the objection from natural kinds. 
The Parity Objection 
Can dualist thought experiments be easily undermined because they 
can be countered with an equally plausible thought experiment to the 
effect that we are identical with our bodies? Maybe I am nonphysical 
yet materially embodied, but maybe, too, I am a physical animal with 
nothing immaterial about me, or maybe I am a part of an animal, namely 
a brain. Michael Hooker, Richard Boyd, Michael Tye, and Dean 
Zimmerman have each challenged the dualist modal argument with 
anti-dualist alternatives.2<l For present purposes, let us refer to this as the 
parity objection. If this strategy is plausible, then the dualist argument 
is at a standstill. 
Given the holist nature of integrative dualism I am not convinced that 
person-body identity is as easily imagined as Hooker ct aT maintain. To 
sharpen my objection, imagine a critic who is somewhat friendly to 
dualism insofar as she believes that, at least initially, it seems possible 
that persons to be disembodied, switch bodies and the like, and thus 
(given some other assumptions noted earlier) it seems possible for per-
sons are nonphysical, and yet she claims it seems equally plausible that 
persons are the very same things as their animal bodies. Zimmerman's 
statement of the parity objection is put in response to Swinburne, "It is 
conceivable ... that I be identical with my body, or some part of it-this is 
a state of affairs which I can imagine easily enough, and with as much 
clarity as Swinburne's favored alternative."21 But how easy is it to distin-
guish two cases, one in which a person is the very same thing as his 
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physical, animal body and another in which he is integrally embodied, 
such that his being an animal consists of his dualistic, integral animal 
embodiment? If one claims to imagine the identity by picturing their 
conative, affective, cognitive, and sensitive embodiment, this would not 
suffice, as the integrative dualist would insist on all such features. One 
may attempt to secure the imagining of person-body identity by envis-
aging the demise of the body bringing about the demise of the person. 
But this also does not suffice for, as noted earlier, being a dualist does 
not require one to believe persons survive bodily death. I propose that 
to distinguish the states of affairs of being identical with one's body as 
opposed to being integrally embodied involves a substantial claim, 
namely, that one is thereby imagining the impossibility of the person sur-
viving the demise of their body. Meanwhile the dualist may distinguish 
the two by relying upon thought experiments in which the person does 
survive, say, in a different body. This difference, I submit, has some 
epistemic advantage that throws the parity objection off balance, tipping 
the scales toward dualism. 
If I am right, do all identity claims suffer some kind of disadvantage 
over against claims to distinguish objects? No, I advance my reply to 
the parity objection when there is at least a live possibility that dualism 
is right. There are many instances of identity claims where there are no 
real competitors in the area. (Is this table this table? This question 
might gain interest only if we were genuinely worked up about time 
slices, mereological essentialism and the like.) I should add that my 
response to the parity objection does not rely on the idea that conceiving 
of possible states of affairs must involve forming visual imagery. Visual 
imagery can assist our examination of what is possible, but it is not 
essential. 
Do the standard dualist scenarios also require commitments to strong 
negative existentials? I imagine having a new body, see nothing meta-
physically outrageous about it, and conclude it is possible. Zimmerman 
has put to me this question: "How do you know that in your imagined 
state of affairs you have not mistakenly overlooked the fact that your 
original body still exists, and that you are identical with it and yet have 
simply failed to notice it?"22 Richard Boyd once cautioned proponents of 
the dualist modal argument on the grounds that physical objects can still 
exist and yet not be detected. 23 Linda Zagzebski has also recorded dis-
satisfaction with the dualist modal strategy. "It is no harder to hide, or 
rather ignore, brains in thought experiments about what can happen to 
me than it is to hide the fact that water has a certain chemical structure 
in thought experiments about the water in this glass."24 
Perhaps, if persons or brains are physical points, imagining the 
absence of a person or brain would be quite difficult. Very few, if any, 
would embrace such a metaphysical spectacle (even the luz bone had 
some sort of volume), and bulky, messy brains are, I believe, difficult to 
hide in thought experiments. In reply to Zimmerman's objection, dual-
ists will, of course, assume that while entertaining the disembodiment 
thought experiment they are still integrally embodied in the way they 
have always been and yet they are imagining some alternative configura-
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tion. I imagine being in Paris next spring and assume this is metaphysi-
cally possible. The fact that I am now in Minnesota does not undercut 
the epistemic force of imagining the alternative, any more than conceding 
it is possible that I could be in Paris without realizing it or that I could be 
in Minnesota high on LSD and be absolutely convinced I am in Paris.25 
As I have advanced a de re modal argument without claiming that modal 
intuitions are infallible, cases in which one can mistakenly suppose some-
thing is possible-whether it be water without H20 or the trisecting of an 
angle-do not show the argument is without force. 
By way of a further reply to Zagzebski, I note the disanalogy with the 
water-H20 case. Water being H20 involves straightforward mereological 
constitution in which increasingly close inspection of water in mass reveals 
its structure. There is a seamless procedure of empirical investigation here, 
whereas most philosophers (including noneliminative materialists) will 
concede the person-body relation to be on a different footing. To be sure, 
physicalists charge that empirical inquiry justifies their position, but typical-
ly they correctly observe that this is a matter of philosophical argument on 
the basis of empirical data and not just a matter of empirical data alone. 
Once we are aware of the empirical foundation for a water-H20 identity, it is 
difficult to hide the H20 in aquatic thought experiments. If the parity objec-
tor can establish that we are similarly warranted in endorsing person-body 
identity, a defense of dualism will need to address that claim head on. The 
dualist modal argument is advanced here on the assumption that empirical 
inquiry does not definitively either favor or undermine dualism. I believe it 
is possible to take on board the latest findings of the physical sciences and 
yet conceive of disembodiment and body-switching with a clarity, detail, 
and ostensible coherence that is not available in the water-H20 case. 
Consider a final development of the parity objection to the effect that 
the dualist is in just as much of a fix as the identity theorist. Assume 
that physical objects are essentially physical and likewise for nonphysical 
ones. By envisaging the person as nonphysical, am I not committed to 
the grand metaphysical tour? I do endorse the great negative existential 
(it is metaphysically impossible for me to be physicaD, but this conclu-
sion emerges down the line. At the beginning, both dualist and identity 
theorist can recognize the essentiality of metaphysical identity (if X is 
physical, X is physical essentially). Let me set up the dualist argument, 
making explicit its open-ended beginning. At the outset I consider the 
state of affairs of my being embodied, unsure (let us say) whether this 
amounts to my being dualistically embodied or being identical with this 
physical body. I then consider cases in which I exist without this body. 
These seem perfectly possible, violate no metaphysical precepts I am 
aware of, and are actually supported by widespread (albeit in principle 
defeasible) reports. I then, following the argument, conclude I am 
indeed distinct from my body. It is because of my envisaging what I 
take to be a bona fide, positive state of affairs (my having a different 
body) that I come to attribute more robust negative existentials to 
myself, not vice versa. 
My reply to the parity argument should not be exaggerated. I submit 
only that, when considering rival accounts of the person-body relation 
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that are granted initial plausibility, it is not as easy to envisage clearly 
the identity as opposed to the dualist schema. One can grant this, of 
course, and then go on to argue that materialism should still be pre-
ferred on other grounds. 
The Natural Kinds Objection 
Linda Zagzebski has objected to my de re modal argument based 
upon a potent account of natural kinds and identity. The problem with 
my argument is that it employs modal claims quite independent of con-
cern for natural kinds, specifically, for our being animals. 
Whatever natural kind I belong to is essential to me. So if I am 
an animal I am essentially an animal, and if I am a human I am 
essentially a human ... If we accept as an a priori truth that the 
natural kind to which I belong is essential to me, then whatever 
science discovers about the nature of humans or animals would 
be essential to me. Presumably it is essential to animals to have 
bodies, and likewise for humans. I conclude that the de re argu-
ment is threatened with failure provided that there is some such 
a priori truth which connects the discoveries of empirical science 
with the concept of the natural kind to which I belong 
... Taliaferro says that we are animals, but since he denies that 
we are essentially embodied, he must think that some animals 
arc not essentially embodied. Since other animals presumably 
are essentially embodied, to deny that we are is analogous to 
admitting that water is a liquid but denying that chemical con-
stitution is essential to the water in this glass while agreeing that 
the chemical constitution of other liquids is essential to them.26 
Has the de re modal argument thereby run aground? 
An integrative dualist can well maintain that the materially embodied 
whole of person and body is essentially material. My animal body is 
essentially material and as a material animal I am too. But Zagzebski is 
right that I am calling into question whether it is essential to me (the 
individual person) that I am embodied as I am and, thus, as this particu-
lar animal. Am I forced into a position similar to holding such desperate 
beliefs about water? Not quite, though, for some, my views here may 
seem wildly extravagant. It is not obvious to me that all individuals that 
are nonhuman animals are in fact essentially embodied as they are. Do 
the vast number of people who believe in reincarnation-in which there 
is a trans-migration of souls across species-believe in something which 
is metaphysically impossible? This is not clear, in my view. I will not 
try to bolster my stance by advancing disembodiment and body-switch-
ing cases, such as Socrates becoming an alligator. Rather, I offer the 
rejoinder of Joseph Butler to a similar objection. While I adopt a dualist 
reading of both human and nonhuman animal life, Butler's modest posi-
tion may be more appealing. According to Butler, we simply do not 
know whether nonhuman animal beings of necessity lose their extant 
ANIMALS, BRAINS, AND SPIRITS 577 
identity (what he referred to as their living powers) at biological disinte-
gration, the dissolution of their membership in their specific natural 
kind animal species.27 Is the failure to see that the individuals can sur-
vive equivalent to seeing that they can't? I do not think so. Butler's 
strategy here is similar to one that is now familiar in the problem of evil 
literature in which much is made about the difference between not see-
ing the point of evil and seeing there is no point to eviP" I do not believe 
we are currently justified in believing that reincarnation across species is 
metaphysically impossible and thus not in a position to hold that indi-
vidual animals essentially have the bodies they do. 
In the absence of overriding, non-question-begging reasons for 
accepting Zagzebski's view of individuals and animals, I do not think 
the dualist modal argument is at all threatened. There is currently little 
consensus on natural kinds among philosophers. The integrative dualist 
may well agree that the physical sciences can identify essential features 
of natural kinds (to be an alligator requires instantiating a substantial 
subset of such and such properties) and yet either deny, as I do, that 
individual animals are essentially embodied Of, more modestly, with-
hold judgment about the essential embodiment of all nonhuman ani-
mals. Should the modal dualist argument warrant believing we are not 
essentially embodied and there be (as many believe) good reason to 
think some nonhuman animals are persons, then a case may be made 
that goes further than Butlerian agnosticism.2c; 
Concluding Remarks and Dualist Advice to Some Materialists 
By way of trying to articulate further the resources of integrative 
dualism, I conclude with comments on an intramural materialist debate 
between animalists and brain centered materialists. This will, I hope, 
throw into relief my response to the parity objection and showcase some 
of the virtues of integrative dualism. 
David Wiggens, Bernard Williams, Paul Snowden, and Quassim 
Cassam are a few of the advocates of animalism, sometimes called 
neoAristotelianism, which sees human beings as physical animals. They 
oppose materialists who envisage the human person as principally the 
brain, and who thereby pinpoint the locus of personal identity as the 
grey cells. The debate is often focussed on the status of thought experi-
ments, with the brain team (Mark Johnston among others) using revised 
Robinson-Brown cases to bolster the judgment that the person goes with 
the brain. In Mark Johnston's view, you go with your brain.") This is 
opposed by animalists on a number of fronts, sometimes by the whole-
sale rejection of thought experiments but most often by charging that a 
brain centered approach violates our customary, common sense way of 
thinking of each other. If I am merely a brain, am I a human organism 
or merely just a part of one? David Oderberg has recently put pressure 
on the brain materialists to move toward either full-scale animalism or a 
Parfitian psychological reductionism which gives pride of place to men-
tal continuity without nonphysical substances. What to do?31 
I suggest that brain centered materialists can use some of the same 
578 Faith and Philosophy 
strategies I have in defending integrative dualism. They can, for exam-
ple, contend that in a properly functioning enbrained life the person 
may be properly identified as an animal. The claim that we are animals 
is indeed true in a brain materialist scheme, as it is true also for integra-
tive dualism. Describing oneself as an animal is, I believe, neutral with 
respect to a host of accounts of what it is that constitutes one's being an 
animal. Effectively securing this point helps to overturn some of the 
ordinary language objections. As for thought experiments, I think the 
brain materialists have the same modal edge over the anima lists that T 
claimed for the dualists, though reports of brain transfers are less preva-
lent than person-body transfers! 
In all, however, I think the present debate can highlight the merits of 
dualism. Parfitian claims of psychological continuity sustained in body-
transferring thought experiments make one suspicious of positing a nec-
essary connection between personal identity and the particular body or 
brain one has. On the other hand, there is great appeal to the animal 
and brain advocates' charge that their views have the advantage because 
of their positing a substantial individual thing doing the thinking, feel-
ing, and acting that comprises personal life. Those of us who are not 
convinced that Humean bundles and Parfitian complexes can account 
for personal identity, but are impressed by thought experiments that 
bring to light the precariousness of brain and animal identity, are in a 
bind. This is where integrative dualism of the kind defended here can 
come in. It provides a substantive individual as the one who thinks, acts, 
and feels, but one that is not essentially embodied as a specific animal or 
brain, allowing body switching and disembodiment.32 
So, I submit that dualism has not outlived its usefulness. For theists 
who resist the Hobbesian urge to think of God as corporeal-however 
pure, simple and invisible-and who retain belief that God is a nophysi-
cal person-like reality, the debate over dualism can be a focal point for 
defending key components in a philosophy of God. Dualism can, I 
believe, be articulated in an integrative form that does not carry with it 
the ethical and theological encumbrances often affixed to it. Moreover, 
there is at least one argument for dualism, based on plausible thought 
experiments, with a force that is commonly underestimated." 
St. Olaf College 
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